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Rapid economic development in China and its emergence as a major exporter of 
manufactured products since the late 1970s has had two major effects on its neighboring 
Asian economies. First it is now a major importer of goods from those economies. Second it 
has become a serious competitor for market share in their major trading partners such as the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan (e.g., Song 2000).  
  South Korea (henceforth Korea) is a case in point that demonstrates clearly this dual 
effect of China’s rapid economic development on its neighboring economies. Bilateral trade 
between the two countries has grown steadily in both volume and variety of goods traded. 
Between 1989 and 2001, for instance, Korea’s merchandise exports to China grew from 
$1.3 to $18.2 billion while China’s merchandise exports to Korea increased from $472 
million to $12.5 billion (UNCOMTRADE). This expansion in bilateral trade is a sign that 
economic growth in post-reform China has had a positive  effect on the Korean economy.  
  For economies such as Korea, China’s rapid industrialization has also had the 
negative effect of  displacing their exports in third-country markets.
1 Comparative 
advantage in many, especially labor-intensive, manufacturing industries has now shifted 
from those countries to China while they have yet to develop new areas of comparative 
advantage (Abe and Lee 2001, Kim and Lee 2002, Nam 2004). Indeed, Korea’s present 
perceived dilemma has been portrayed as a “nutcracker” situation, as it has lost its 
comparative advantage in many of its manufacturing industries while it is yet to gain a 
comparative advantage in technologically more advanced industries (Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton 1997). Obviously, this nutcracker situation will be only temporary and short-lived 
if Korea succeeds in gaining a comparative advantage in new areas that will sustain its 
economic growth. Otherwise it will persist over the long run with adverse consequences for 
the Korean economy. 
  The emergence of China as an economic power has had both a positive and a 
negative effect on the Taiwanese economy as well. Between 1995 and 2003 China’s share 
of Taiwan’s exports grew from 16.0 to 24.6 percent, and China is now Taiwan’s largest 
export market. Along with this positive effect, however, China’s economic growth has 
siphoned off capital and management expertise from Taiwan with a consequent negative 
effect on the economy of the latter (Chen 2004). Singapore is another case where China has 
provided expanding markets for exports while taking away markets and foreign direct 
investment from it at the same time (Liu 2004).   
  While China’s economic growth has benefited Japan in that its trade with China has 
  1been expanding rapidly, it has at the same time created some concern, if not fear, in Japan. 
For Japan, however, the situation does not appear as dire as for Korea and Taiwan because 
its economy is more advanced than the latter two. It will be long before China catches up 
with Japan, if it ever does, and there will be enough time for Japanese firms to focus on 
producing highly-specialized high-tech products and initiate new approaches to 
management, production, and distribution (Abe 2004).  It is rather  the resource-rich 
ASEAN countries, whose factor endowments and stage of economic development are more 
similar to China than those of the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) and Japan, that  
appear to be more vulnerable. 
  Hence, rapid economic development in China has certainly created concern in East 
Asia as this brief survey of arguments in the literature points out. It is inevitable that when a 
large economy such as China starts developing rapidly it creates serious effects, both  
positive and  negative, on smaller neighboring economies. Whether the effect will turn out 
to be largely positive or negative will depend not only on the ability of smaller economies to 
adjust to the changes brought about by its giant neighbor but also on the latter’s willingness 
to facilitate the adjustment with policies such as freer access to its markets.  
In this paper we examine the effect that rapid economic development in China has 
brought about in East Asia and, in particular, consider recent evidence as to whether its 
emergence as a global powerhouse has been or will be detrimental to the growth prospects 
of the region. For this purpose we have chosen Korea as a representative economy of the 
NIEs and Thailand as that of the near-NIEs. These two economies provide a comparative 
perspective as Korea is more advanced than Thailand in manufacturing. In section II we 
specifically examine the trends and characteristics of Korea’s overall export structure for 
1986-2001 to gauge the extent to which China’s export structure has “caught up” with that 
of Korea. We show that exports from China have in fact displaced considerably Korean 
exports to Japan and the United States, Korea’s two major trading partners. In section III we 
investigate the trends and characteristics of China-Korea bilateral trade. We show that their 
bilateral trade has increased more rapidly than their respective trade with the rest of the 
world and that there is an increasing amount of intra-industry trade between the two 
countries. In Section IV we provide an aggregated analysis of Thai and Chinese trade in an 
East Asian comparative context. While the analysis is suggestive it underscores the same 
general trends that we find in the Korean case. Section V examines explicitly the structure 
and similarity of trade of Chinese and East Asian exports; it estimates the degree to which 
they are competitive by calculating changes in Spearman rank correlation coefficients over 
time. In Section VI we attempt to capture any potential “investment diversion” to China 
with a simple model of foreign direct investment  (FDI). Section VII concludes the paper.  
  2 
II.  Convergence of China to Korea in Export Structure 
For an overall picture of changes in the export structure of China and Korea we first 
examine the sectoral distribution of their exports at the 1-digit Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) level, using the United Nations trade statistics (UNCOMTRADE). 
We find that in 1986-2001 China, and Korea to a lesser extent, went through a major change 
in their export structure (Table 1). 
 
     < T a b l e   1   h e r e >  
 
In 1986, manufactured goods (SITC6), mineral fuels (SITC3), food and live animals 
(SITC0), and crude material (SITC2) accounted for close to 90 percent of China’s exports, 
indicating that China’s comparative advantage was then mainly in simple manufactured 
goods and raw materials. By 2001, however, China made a significant change in its export 
structure with machinery and transport equipment (SITC7), miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (SITC8), and manufactured goods (SITC6) together accounting for 85 percent of its 
total exports. The first two sectors increased their export share from 1.77 and 4.22 percent 
in 1986 to 35.65 and 32.54 percent in 2001, respectively—a clear sign that China was 
becoming rapidly industrialized, making a significant change in its export structure in only 
15 years. What is noteworthy is that the most dramatic change in the export structure took 
place during the five-year period of 1986-91.    
Korea has also experienced changes in its export structure, albeit not as drastic as in 
China over the same time period. In 1986, three manufacturing sectors—SITC7, SITC8, and 
SITC6—together accounted for 89.14 percent of Korea’s exports, a sign that by 1986 Korea 
had become a highly industrialized economy. By 2001, the share of exports of the last two 
sectors dropped significantly to 7.44 and 18.11 percent from 31.97 and 23.59 percent in 
1986, respectively, while the share of SITC7 increased from 33.58 to 57.43 percent. These 
are signs that Korea’s comparative advantage has been shifting from low-wage, labor-
intensive to capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing industries. 
The above analysis of changes in the export structure, which is based on the one-
digit SITC sector classification, provides us with a rough measure of the change in 
comparative advantage that has taken place in China and Korea but says little regarding 
what might have brought about the change. Is it a change in factor endowments or an 
improvement in technology that has brought about the change? The data based on the one-
digit SITC classification are too aggregate to provide an answer to this question. The SITC8 
sector (miscellaneous manufactured articles), for instance, includes labor-intensive, low 
  3technology products such as apparel, footwear, and toys as well as high technology products 
such as photographic apparatus and medical instruments. The SITC6 sector (manufactured 
goods) also covers a diverse set of products that range from labor-intensive textile fabric to 
resource-based rubber and aluminum and capital-intensive tube and pipes.  
To help us find an answer to the question of what may possible have brought about 
the change in export structure, we group products in terms of production technology. That is, 
following Lall (2000) we divide the products classified at the 3-digit SITC level into ten 
subgroups divided in terms of the level of production technology. This is done in two steps: 
first, the products are divided into five groups—primary products (PP), resource-based 
products (RB), low-technology products (LT), medium-technology products (MT), and high 
technology products (HT); and the latter four are then divided further into agriculture-based 
products (RB1), other resource-based products (RB2), textile/fashion cluster (LT1), other 
low-technology products (LT2), automotive products (MT1), process industries—chemical 
and basic metals—(MT2), engineering products (MT3), electronics and electrical products 
(HT1), and other high-technology products (HT2).   
It is clear from Table 2 that changes in China’s export structure are highly correlated 
with its increasing ability to produce technologically more sophisticated products. In 1986 a 
little more than a half of China’s exports was in primary products such as crude petroleum, 
gas, vegetables, and rice, with low technology products and “advanced” products 
accounting for 25 and approximately 10 percent, respectively. But by 2001, China made a 
dramatic change in its export structure, achieving a remarkable increase in the export of 
medium and high technology products, especially in the export of engineering products 
(MT3) and electronics (HT1). Their combined share of exports increased from less than two 
percent in 1986 to more than 35 percent in 2001. 
    
     < T a b l e   2   h e r e >  
 
China also increased exports from low-technology industries (LT1 and LT2) during 
the same period—albeit not as much as those from technologically more sophisticated 
industries--expanding their share of exports from 25 percent in 1986 to a little over 39 
percent in 2001. These industries, which require relatively simple skills and compete mostly 
on price, have served as an engine of China’s export growth during the 1986-2001 period, 
taking advantage of China’s abundant supply of low-cost labor.  
As noted above, China has rapidly increased its exports of electronics and other 
electrical products. Although they are classified as high-technology products, the nature of 
technology associated with their production in China is quite varied. While some of them 
  4require advanced technology and extensive R&D, others involve only simple labor-
intensive processes. Furthermore, many of these products are only assembled at the foreign-
owned or joint venture enterprises that are in China mainly to take advantage of its low-cost 
labor (Fung and Iizaka 2002). At present China may be able to export these products only 
with the help of foreign investors, but that does not mean that it will remain so for long. 
Given that FDI has enabled rapid catching-up industrialization in other parts of Asia 
(Yamazawa 1990), there is no reason why China will not be able to do the same and 
replicate the catch-up development achieved by Japan and the Asian NIEs.  
In the case of Korea the most dramatic increase took place in the export share of 
electronics and electrical products (HT1), albeit not as much as in China. But unlike in the 
case of China this increase is from Korea’s indigenous firms, an indication that they have 
acquired their own capability for producing high technology products. Also, as to be 
expected, the export share of textiles (LT1) and other labor-intensive products (LT2) 
decreased from a combined share of 43 percent to a little over 16 percent.  
To further buttress the findings reported above we calculate revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA)
2 indices for China and Korea. With the usual caveat we take an increasing 
value of a country’s RCA in a product as an indication that it is gaining a comparative 
advantage in that product, and conversely when the RCA is decreasing. 
It is evident from Table 3 that between 1986 and 2001 China rapidly shed its 
comparative advantage in primary products (PP) while maintaining its comparative 
advantage in textiles (LT1) and gaining one in other labor-intensive products, a sign of a 
diversifying export structure. The increase of RCA indices in engineering products and 
electronics is also impressive. Although China did not have a comparative advantage in 
engineering products (MT3), as indicated by an RCA of less than unity, and although it 
gained a comparative advantage in electronics and electrical products (HT1) only in 2001, 
the direction of change is clear: it is rapidly gaining a comparative advantage in these 
products. 
  
  <Table  3  here> 
 
A comparison of changes in RCA for China and Korea suggests two points. One is 
that in terms of comparative advantage Korea is ahead of China in MT2, MT3 and HT1—a 
sign that in terms of manufacturing technology Korea is ahead of China. The other point is 
that China’s gain in comparative advantage in LT2 appears exactly matched by Korea’s loss 
in the same. Combined with the fact that China had achieved a strong comparative 
  5advantage in LT1 while Korea was losing it, this indicates that China is following Korea in 
the “catching-up product cycle” development (Akamatsu 1962, Yamazawa 1990).  
With China catching up with Korea one would expect export competition to increase 
between the two with the exports from the former replacing those from the latter in many of 
the world’s markets.  Investigation of changes in the two countries’ market shares in Japan 
and the United States confirm this expectation (Kim, Kim and Lee 2004). In Japan’s ten 
major imports from China in 1987-2001 China made a significant increase in market share 
at the expense of Korea with the exception of SITC 77, 89, and 75. This apparent 
displacement in Japan of Korea’s exports by China’s exports took place mostly in labor-
intensive low technology and raw material industries—the industries in which Korea no 
longer holds a strong comparative advantage. This displacement, however, is not limited to 
those industries: even in the market for telecommunication and sound recording products 
(SITC 76) China increased its market share by 27 percentage points between 1987 and 2001 
while Korea lost its market share by about 20 percentage points. 
   A similar displacement took place in the United States, another major trading 
partner for both China and Korea. In the ten major U.S. imports from China it made a 
significant gain in the market share at the expense of Korea with the exception of SITC75, 
76, and 77. This displacement of Korea’s exports by China’s exports took place, as to be 
expected, in labor-intensive low-technology industries. What is, however, interesting (and 
also puzzling) is that unlike in Japan Korea does not appear to have lost its U.S. market 
share to China in SITC76 (telecommunication and sound recording products), keeping its 
market share steady at about 10 percent.  
 
II. China-Korea  Bilateral  Trade: Trends and Characteristics  
While Korea has been losing its market share to China in third-country markets the bilateral 
trade between the two has been increasing. Although this increase is to be expected as 
concomitant to China’s expanding international trade, we ask here whether economic 
development in China has had more than the “average” effect on the China-Korea bilateral 
trade. To answer this question of whether the increase in the China-Korea bilateral trade 
was greater than the average growth of their respective trade with the rest of the world, we 
calculate export- and import- intensity indices for China and Korea, respectively.
3 These 
indices are calculated for 1987 and 2001 and are reported in parenthesis in Tables 4 and 5.  
  In 1987 China’s export-intensity index with respect to Korea was less than one, 
indicating that China exported a smaller share of its exports to Korea than its average for the 
rest of the world. But in 2001 China’s export-intensity index with respect to Korea 
increased significantly. China’s import-intensity index with respect to Korea moved in a 
  6manner similar to its export-intensity index. Korea’s export-intensity with respect to China 
increased from zero to 2.77 over the period while its import-intensity index moved in a 
similar direction. These increases in export- and import-intensity indices indicate that 
bilateral trade between the two countries has expanded faster than their respective trade 
with the rest of the world.  
 
      <Tables 4 and 5 here> 
 
  When two economies become similar to each other in terms of factor endowments 
and technology at higher levels of economic development, there is a tendency for intra-
industry trade between them to expand relative to their inter-industry trade. With China 
converging with Korea with respect to export structure we would thus expect intra-industry 
trade between the two to expand over time.    
To find out whether there was in fact such an expansion of intra-industry trade 
between China and Korea we calculate the intra-industry trade index, based on Grubel-
Lloyd.
4 The index takes a value between zero and one, with zero indicating that the country 
either exports or imports the good in question and one indicating that it simultaneously 
exports and imports an equal amount of the same good, thus being engaged fully in intra-
industry trade. To calculate the index we use the trade data based on the SITC4-digit 
classification (more than 1,000 industries), a classification disaggregate enough to give a 
meaningful measure of intra-industry trade. We then take a weighted average of the indices 
thus calculated, the weight being the trade share of each industry, to calculate the intra-
industry trade index for the entire country and for a few select manufacturing sectors. 
 
<Table 6 here> 
 
The figures in the row with the heading of “Total Trade” in Table 6 report the intra-
industry trade index of total global trade of China and Korea for four different years. We 
find that there was an upward trend in the index for the two countries’ global trade. That is, 
between 1987 and 2001 the index increased from 0.25 to 0.38 for China and from 0.29 to 
0.44 for Korea. The figures for the sectoral index show, however, that this upward trend 
was by and large due to an increase in intra-industry trade in SITC6 in the case of China and 
SITC5, 7 and 8 in the case of Korea. This is not surprising, given that intra-industry trade is 
of greater importance in manufacturing industries, in which product differentiation and 
scale economies are more prevalent than in other sectors of the economy and given the 
convergence in the export structure of China to Korea reported above.  
  7The figures in the column under the heading of “Bilateral Trade” report the index for 
bilateral intra-industry trade between China and Korea. It is clear that for China intra-
industry trade with Korea is much less important, albeit on an upward trend, than its intra-
industry trade with the rest of the world. The same is true for Korea.  
Product differentiation and scale economies are the standard explanations given for 
intra-industry trade. There is, however, another reason why it may have expanded between 
China and Korea, that is, an increasing international fragmentation of production processes. 
As noted earlier, studies have shown that many of China’s exports of high-technology 
products are from foreign-owned or joint venture firms that are in China to take advantage 
of its low cost labor. These firms are basically assembly operations that put together 
imported parts for sale outside of China, and since many of these imports and exports are in 
the same SITC groups they would be reported as intra-industry trade. Between 1987 and 
2001 there indeed was an increase in parts trade between China and Korea, indicating an 
increasing fragmentation of production processes and an expansion of production networks 
(Kim, Kim and Lee 2004). In SITC75 and 76 groups, especially, the parts trade was 
significantly more than 50 percent of trade in those sectors.  
As noted earlier, many Korean firms have invested in China to manufacture 
products for export markets. Some of the exports are to Korea and others are to third-
country markets, and what appears to be a competitive relationship between China and 
Korea is in fact a relationship based on partnership between the two countries to the extent 
that the exports from China are produced by Korean affiliates. For instance, the loss of a 
market share in Japan and the United States by Korean exporters to Chinese exporters may 
be in part a displacement of exports from Korea by exports from Korean affiliates in China.  
 
IV.   Is Thailand Losing Out to China? 
Has the emergence of China as a major presence on international markets harmed the 
prospects of the Thai economy? To answer this question we first examine the structure of 
Chinese and Thai trade with the two largest import markets in the world, the United States 
and the European Union (EU). We do this in the context of the changing patterns of other 
East Asian exports to these markets as well.    
Table 7(a) and (b) give details of Chinese and Thai exports to two principal markets, 
the United States and the EU, at the 1-digit SITC level for selected years in  1990-99 for the 
United States, and every year in  1995-1999 for the EU.
5  We also include other NIE and 
ASEAN markets—including a reproduction of the Korea data—for comparison. 
 
    <Table  7a  and  b  here> 
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  For both Chinese and Thai exports, it is evident that the United States is by far the 
larger export market of the two. In 1999, total Chinese and Thai exports to the United States 
came to $82 and $14 billion, respectively, compared to $53 and $10 billion to the EU. 
Moreover, the growth rate of Chinese exports to the United States has been far greater in 
recent years, with exports to the U.S. market growing by about two-thirds in 1995-99 and to 
the EU by about just over one-half. The respective Thai export growth rates to the U.S. and 
EU markets over the same period were far less impressive, at approximately one-fifth to 
both markets.
6  In fact, the increase in Chinese exports to the United States over the 1990s, 
from $16 billion to $82 billion, is nothing short of spectacular.   
With respect to the composition of trade, we focus on the U.S. market, which is by 
far the largest although most of the same conclusions hold for the EU market as well. In 
1990, Chinese exports to the United States were dominated by SITC8 (miscellaneous 
manufactures), 62 percent of the total, with SITC7 (electrical and non-electrical machinery 
and equipment) coming in a distant second with 16 percent. Over the 1990s, these two 
categories continued to be dominant, but the share of the latter doubled to 32 percent while 
the share of the former fell to 52 percent. As SITC7 tends to include more sophisticated 
product lines than SITC8, this trend has often been cited as an indication of a growing 
sophistication of Chinese exports.  The same general structural change in exports is also 
evident in the EU market, though it is somewhat less pronounced over the 1995-99 period. 
Thai exports to the United States experienced less structural change but in the same 
direction: SITC7 was only slightly less important than SITC8 in 1990 (a 31 percent share 
versus 32 percent) but came to dominate by 1999, accounting for 45 percent of total exports, 
as opposed to only 27 percent in the case of SITC8.  Again, we note the same trend in the 
EU market. 
Hence, looking merely at general changes in export structure at the 1-digit level of 
aggregation, we find that, while Chinese and Thai export structures were quite different in 
1990, by 1999 they had converged considerably. This exercise thus suggests that China is 
indeed becoming an increasing competitor with Thailand in its key export markets. In fact, 
in 1990 the value of Chinese exports of SITC7 goods came to about $2.6 billion in 
comparison with to $1.7 billion in the case of Thailand.  By 1999, the respective figures 
were $26 billion and $6 billion; hence, Chinese exports of SITC7 products to the United 
States were over four times greater than Thai exports, despite being a lower share of the 
total. 
  9This result is consistent with the conclusions of the analysis of Korea’s trade in the 
preceding section.  It is also borne out in Table 7(a) and (b) for the other East Asian 
countries.   
However, as was noted in the context of the China-Korea relationship above, a 1-
digit SITC level of aggregation is fairly high and can lead to misleading conclusions as 
SITC7, as discussed above, includes both labor- and capital-intensive products. Thus, in the 
following  section, we attempt to gauge competition at a lower  level of aggregation. 
We briefly examine the structure of imports of China and Thailand from the United 
States and the EU.
7 In the case of U.S. exports, SITC7 products were the most important in 
both Chinese and Thai markets over the 1990-99 period, coming to 54  and 61 percent, 
respectively, and in each case the share increased (though only slightly in the case of 
Thailand). Chemical exports constituted the second most important category in the case of 
both markets. Hence, like the structure of their exports, the Chinese and Thai import 
structures have been increasing in sophistication and in areas in which intra-industry trade 
tends to be more important.  Indeed, given the “globalized” nature of the SITC7 category 
and the diversity of products in terms of factor intensity, the rising share of electronics in 
total imports and exports reflects the increasing international fragmentation of production 
processes (in fact, there is no doubt a good deal of “double counting” in these numbers, in 
which SITC7 imports serve as inputs to SITC7 exports).                  
 
V.  Correlation between Chinese and East Asian Exports to OECD Markets 
Are Chinese and East Asian exports to major markets highly correlated? Has the correlation 
between the two increased  over time?  These questions would seem to be the most essential 
in gauging to what extent  China competes with Thailand in their major markets and 
whether or not this competition has become more intense over time. In the cases of Korea 
(aggregate and disaggregate) and Thailand (aggregate), the answer appears to be in the 
affirmative. But does it hold at a highly disaggregated level, and has it been increasing over 
time? 
  In order to address these questions, we use disaggregated trade data at the 5-digit 
SITC level for individual years over the 1995-1999 period, using data gleaned from the 
OECD, International Trade Statistics 2003 (CD-Rom). The technique we use is the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient (SRCC), which is a non-parametric estimate of the 
rankings of two series (in this case, the ranking of export structures to various markets) with  
the domain of negative one (perfect negative correlation) to one (perfect correlation), with 
zero implying no correlation. We calculate these statistics for exports to the OECD as a 
  10group as well as to principal individual markets for  1999, 1997, and 1995.
8  The results are 
summarized in Table 8. 
 
    <Table  8  here> 
 
  The picture that emerges tends to support the conclusions reached in the preceding  
analysis albeit to differing degrees and with additional caveats. For exports to the OECD as 
a whole, in 1999 Chinese exports were correlated to the highest degree with Taiwan (0.473), 
Thailand (0.446), and the Philippines (0.443). It is impossible to state whether or not these 
values are high in terms of magnitudes, but at such a low level of aggregation they are 
nevertheless impressive (the number of observations for each country falls in the range of 
1600-2100 commodities). To give an idea of the aggregation bias we carried out the same 
exercise on the basis of 3-digit SITC; the SRCC statistics rise then to 0.73, 0.72, and 0.64 
for Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, respectively.
9  This underscores the importance 
of disaggregated trade analysis in the context of the increased globalization of production 
processes, a point that was underscored as well in the  preceding discussion on Korea. 
  Moreover, these SRCC estimates appear to be rising over time. In all cases of 
exports to the OECD as a whole, the correlation coefficients have been rising since the mid-
1990s.   
  At the individual OECD market level, the highest correlations between Chinese and 
East Asian exports emerge in the U.S. market, which is the largest for the majority of these 
countries, followed by exports to the EU, Japan, and Korea. In most cases, the magnitudes 
of the SRCC estimates are smaller, but there is a far less consistent positive trend in the 
SRCCs relative to the overall OECD estimates. For example, in the case of the U.S. market, 
SRCC estimates were actually lower in 1999 than in 1995 for all East Asian partners save 
Taiwan, which, not coincidentally, also has the highest degree of correlation with Chinese 
exports.     
  
VI.  Is There “Investment Diversion”? The Case of China and Thailand 
It has been pointed out that China has supplanted Southeast Asia as the destination of much 
of FDI to Asia (e.g., Liu 2004). To determine whether or not China has in fact had this 
“investment diversion” effect on the flow of FDI we would need a model of investment 
inflows to individual Asian countries and then test the hypothesis that the opening of the 
Chinese economy has had a negative effect on FDI inflows to other Asian economies. Data 
limitation prevents us from taking this approach.
10 We, instead, estimate the determinants of 
outward investment from major FDI-source countries (the United States, France, Germany, 
  11and Japan) and examine whether or not China or Thailand constitutes a special case. We do 
this by running regressions for outflows from each of those countries and for outflows from 
them as a group (controlling for country fixed effects). If China has no statistical influence 
on these flows and hence does not present a special case we will be able to draw the 
(conditional) conclusion that its FDI inflows from the four countries has not been at the 
expense of other host countries.     
The econometric procedure we adopt for our purpose is called the gravity model that 
commonly stipulates the FDI inflow to a country in a given year as a function of GDP of the 
source country (a proxy for “size”), per capita income
11 (a proxy for “wealth”), and the 
distance between the two countries.
12 In order to find out whether trade has any effect on 
FDI inflows and whether China (and Thailand) constitutes a special case as FDI destination 
we add additional variables to the standard gravity model. We thus include a trade variable 
for the first effect and a binary dummy variable for the second. 
We begin by running these regressions for major sources of FDI, that is, the United 
States, Japan, France, and Germany, for 1982-1999.
13 Given data reporting problems we 
have a different set of countries and years for each OECD country. 
  
  <Table  9a  here> 
 
The results, reported in Table 9(a), are generally consistent with what we  would 
expect in terms of the standard gravity-model variables. The adjusted R
2s vary considerably 
across the regressions, from 0.78 for Japan to 0.21 for the United States. The range is 
consistent with what one normally finds in gravity models of this sort. Size does make a 
positive difference in the case of Japanese and German FDI outflows (though the 
magnitudes are small); while the estimated coefficients are also positive for U.S. and French 
FDI, they are not statistically significant at the 90 percent level. The wealth variable also 
demonstrates heterogeneity across countries, being significant and positive for U.S. FDI, 
significant and negative for German FDI, and insignificant for the others. As FDI theory 
does not suggest any particular sign on this variable at the aggregate level, these results 
come as no surprise.
14 The same is true regarding the distance variable. It may, for instance, 
be correlated with cultural differences and, hence, at the margin is negatively correlated 
with FDI. Or, alternatively, it may be positively correlated with FDI if the motivation for 
investment is to reduce transactions costs such as transportation costs associated with 
exports. This ambiguity shows up in our data with distance positively correlated with 
Japanese and French FDI but negatively correlated with U.S. FDI. 
  12Trade is the only variable in the regression that  is consistently positive and 
statistically significant (at the 99 percent level) across all regressions. The correlation 
between trade and FDI clearly bears out the trade-investment nexus. Noteworthy is the fact 
that neither the Chinese nor the Thai binary variable is statistically significant at the 90 
percent level of confidence; that is, the country variable does not explain any of the variance 
in the FDI outflows of the source countries beyond what is explained by the other 
independence variables. We may thus reject the hypothesis that China has diverted 
investments from other Asian economies, contrary to the observations made by many.  
In Table 9(b), we include all of the outflows from the four FDI source countries in a 
panel. While the adjusted R
2 of only 0.16 is lower than for the individual markets, the trade, 
size, wealth and distance variables are all statistically significant and have the expected 
signs. With respect to the country fixed effects, using the United States as the benchmark 
country, we find that only French FDI outflows are statistically significant (at the 99 percent 
level of confidence). As was the case for the individual countries, however, neither the 
Chinese nor the Thai binary variable is statistically significant. 
 
    < T a b l e   9 b   h e r e >  
 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
How China’s economic development will affect its neighboring economies in the long run 
is obviously difficult to tell. In the short- or intermediate-run they will be confronted with 
the problems of structural adjustment as China’s industry develops, forcing them out of 
many of the sectors in which they now have a comparative advantage. Clearly, the 
challenge for the small neighboring economies is to develop new areas of comparative 
advantage that will help them achieve sustained economic growth while benefiting from 
China’s economic growth. 
  In Korea the government has selected a number of industries such as digital TV and 
next-generation mobile phones as the new industries that will lead the country’s economic 
growth (Chun 2003). It is not clear, however, what specific measures the government can 
provide to promote those industries. Industrial policies such as those used to promote the 
heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s will be, we suspect, no longer appropriate 
for the Korean economy, which has become too big and too complex for such policies to be 
effective. Barring such policies, the government’s role will be limited to providing public 
goods and social infrastructure, especially to promote high-value service industries, and 
keeping the capital and labor markets flexible and efficient.  
  13  The history of world economic primacy shows that the economies that once held the 
position of economic primacy subsequently declined for reasons that were generally unique 
to each case. In the case of Venice, for example, which held a world commercial leadership 
in 1550 but declined to insignificance some years before 1700, the factors that led to its 
decline included the competition from Portugal in spices, Britain in woolens, and the 
Netherlands and Britain in shipping; the rigid attitude of guilds and workers; and a leveling 
off of productivity (Kindleberger 1996, p.65). Spain and the Low Countries, whose 
economic growth followed that of Venice, also had a similar fate but for reasons of their 
own. Although what brought about the fall from the position of world economic primacy 
differed from case to case there appears to have been one factor common to all: in all those 
economies rigidity eventually took over the vitality and flexibility that they once had had 
(Kindleberger 1996, p.36). It may have been some uncontrollable external factors that 
triggered the downfall, but it was the inability to adapt to and successfully deal with the 
external changes that ultimately brought that about. And that is a lesson that China’s small 
neighboring countries must learn from the history of world economic primacy: if their 
economic growth ever falters it will be not because of rapid economic development in 
China, which is anyway beyond their own control, but because of the loss of vitality and 
flexibility in their economies. This does not mean, however, that China does not have the 
responsibility to help them facilitate structural change by keeping its doors open for their 
exports. China has an opportunity to exercise this responsibility when considering various 
regional trading arrangements.  
  As is well known, in recent years there has emerged a clear trend towards regional 
trading arrangements as international commercial policy tools.  Regionalism is not new to 
the global marketplace. In fact, Europe has been using it for the past 50 years, both as a 
means of integrating its internal market and as a means of foreign commercial policy with 
non-partners, but what is new is its scope and geographic comprehensiveness. In particular, 
Asian countries, which had generally shunned preferential trading arrangements in the past 
(ASEAN is a minor exception), began to jump on the regionalism band-wagon in the early 
2000s. For instance, before 2000 Japan and Korea had no reciprocal preferential trading 
arrangements but now have a free-trade area arrangement with Singapore (2002) and with 
Chile (2004), respectively. A great number of additional accords are at various stages of 
negotiation. China has become an active member in exploring free-trade areas (FTAs) with 
a variety of potential partners. For example, it has expressed interest in creating an FTA 
with ASEAN by 2010 (including a system of “early harvest” products which would be 
liberalized much sooner), and there are many discussions regarding a possible “ASEAN+3 
FTA” (ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea) and  bilateral arrangements.
15 China is currently 
  14negotiating a bilateral FTA with Singapore, and other ASEAN countries have expressed 
interest in exploring a bilateral agreement to complement an ASEAN-wide accord as well. 
China certainly has a number of commercial-policy strategies it can adopt and their 
effects on the East Asian economies would vary.  Lee et al. (forthcoming) addresses this 
issue using a computational general equilibrium model which undertakes various scenarios 
of such initiatives including: (a) unilateral Chinese trade liberalization; (b) an ASEAN-
China FTA; (c) an ASEAN-Japan FTA; (d) an ASEAN+3 FTA; (e) an ASEAN+China+EU 
FTA; (f) a China-Japan-US FTA; and (g) global free trade.  Their estimates are presented in 
Table 10. 
 
   <Table  10  here> 
  
The results are interesting.  First, clearly China itself would do better to negotiate the 
reductions in its trade barriers rather than do so unilaterally; it gains the most through global 
free-trade and various FTAs. Second, as China will obviously lose out if other FTAs that 
exclude it are negotiated in the region (e.g., ASEAN-Japan), and these FTAs are being 
negotiated, it also has an incentive to go this route as a defensive strategy. Third, when 
China enters into an FTA that excludes an East Asian partner, there tend to be fairly 
significant negative effects on the latter. A China-Japan-US FTA, for example, would 
significantly hurt the NIEs and, especially, ASEAN while generating fairly significant 
benefits to China (second only to global free trade). This is a reflection of many of the 
micro results we have presented in this study: trade competition between China and East 
Asia has been increasing and, hence, these countries are more vulnerable to trade diversion. 
Given that the NIEs and ASEAN generally gain fairly substantially when they are included 
in an agreement in China, this would suggest that East Asia should continue to be inclusive 
rather than exclusive in their regional initiatives.  
  In sum, China is a new major player in international markets and will likely continue 
to be a formidable competitor to its East Asian neighbors. But it also offers myriad 
economic opportunities, both as a rapidly growing market and potential economic partner.  
Hence, the real challenge to East Asia is to respond to the “Chinese Threat” with rigor and 
flexibility, facilitating domestic structural adjustment and enhancing competitiveness at 
home as they integrate into the increasingly borderless international economy.  China may 
be a new player; but the game is the same, and the ball is in the East Asian court. 
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  18    Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The situation in which Korea now finds itself with respect to China parallels that in which 
Japan was before the 1940s. According to Howe (1996), Akamatsu Kaname characterized 
the Japanese economy as being challenged by the “newly industrializing economy” of 
China but lagging behind the West. Akamatsu saw Japan’s situation as a transitional phase 
that required both the domestic and international processes of adjustment but was made 
difficult by the West with its entrenched trading position in East Asia.   
 
2 A country’s RCA in a given commodity is measured as the country’s share of the world’s 
exports of that commodity divided by the country’s share of the total exports of the world. 
An RCA value for a product greater than one is taken to mean that the country has a 
comparative advantage in that product. Since it is calculated using the actual trade values 
that may be “distorted” by tariffs and nontariff barriers, it may not be a true measure of a 
country’s comparative advantage. However, if we can assume that the level of trade barriers 
has not changed over the period that we consider, then changes in RCA can be taken to 
indicate changes in comparative advantage. 
 
3 The export-intensity index is calculated as the share of country j in the total exports of 
country i normalized by country j’s share in the total world imports (excluding country i). If 
the index is greater than one, country j’s share of country i’s total exports is greater than its 
share of total world imports (excluding country i), indicating that country i is more 
dependent on country j for its exports than the average for the rest of the world, and 
conversely if it is less than one. The import-intensity index is calculated as country j’s share 
of the total imports of country i normalized by its share of total world exports (excluding 
country i). Thus if this index is greater than one, country j’s share of country i’s total 
imports is greater than its share of total world exports (excluding country i), indicating that 
country i is more dependent on country j for its imports than the average for the rest of the 
world is, and conversely if it is less than one. 
 
4 The intra-industry trade index is measured as one minus the ratio of the absolute value of 
exports minus imports over exports plus imports of a given industry. 
 
5 We begin in 1995 for the EU, as it is the year of the EU enlargement to include Austria, 
Sweden, and Finland.  The data include all 15 member-states.   
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6 It is important to note, however, that this period is dominated by the financial crisis of 
1997. 
 
7 These data are taken from Plummer (2003). 
 
8 Additional estimates for 1996 and 1998 are available from the second author upon request. 
 
9 SRCC estimates at the 3-digit and 4-digit SITC level, not reported here, are available from 
the second author upon request 
 
10 In particular, such an approach would require annual data based on balance-of-payments 
derived FDI flows, which would lead to severe limitations on degrees of freedom in the 
model. 
 
11 International trade theory suggests that per capita income between countries is correlated 
positively with trade.   
 
12 Gravity models are extremely common in the empirical trade literature and are also 
becoming increasingly common in the empirical FDI literature (e.g., Lee and Roland-Holst 
1999, Kreinin and Plummer 2002). They have been criticized, however, for having a poor 
theoretical foundation, in particular, for not having any price variables when price plays a 
central role in neoclassical trade theory.  Deardorff (1995) has shown that gravity-like 
equations can be derived from certain specifications of the Heckscher-Ohlin model as well 
as additional theoretical trade models. Others have also supported their theoretical and 
empirical credentials (e.g., Frankel 1997 and Rose 2004).     
 
13 Due to data restrictions, we include 1982-1995 for Japan. 
 
14 For example, if the primary motivation for FDI were to seek out low-cost labor, then one 
would expect a negative correlation. However, as the majority of FDI is between developed 
countries, clearly a good deal of FDI is undertaken for different reasons, e.g., market access, 
oligopolistic practices, etc., all of which might predict a positive correlation with wealth.   
 
15 China signed a joint statement in October 2003 to pursue a free-trade area with Japan and 
Korea (Kawai 2004). 
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<Table 1> Sectoral Distribution of Total Exports (share in total exports, %) 
















































China                   
1986  19.16 0.26  16.63 24.45 0.70  4.36 28.45  1.77  4.22  . 
1991  10.28 0.74  4.84  6.62  0.21  5.36  20.51 19.36 31.06  1.03 
1996  6.76 0.89  2.66  3.93 0.25 5.85  19.33 23.35 36.84  0.15 
2001  4.80 0.33  1.55  3.16 0.04 4.97  16.73 35.65 32.54  0.22 
Korea                   
1986  4.52 0.28  0.97  1.87 0.01 3.08  23.59 33.58 31.97  0.14 
1991  2.98 0.16  1.37  2.10 0.00 4.39  22.76 41.70 24.17  0.36 
1996  2.09 0.16  1.24  3.00 0.02 6.98 21.14  52.08  9.17 4.13 
2001  1.47 0.20  1.05  5.34 0.01 8.22 18.11  57.43  7.44 0.74 
Source: UN COMTRADE data 
 
 
<Table 2> Distribution of Total Exports by Technological Category (share in total exports,%)
  PP  RB2  LT1  LT2  MT1  MT2  MT3  HT1  RB1  HT2 
China            
1986  50.93 5.78  8.05 20.99 4.35  0.39 5.26 1.55 0.39 2.30 
1991  18.11 4.44  5.82 31.35  11.42 6.74 5.08  10.13  4.09 1.64 
1996  9.99 5.24 5.59  30.18  15.52  0.94 5.94  11.17  12.59  2.34 
2001  6.92 3.86 5.03  24.71  14.96  1.55 5.06  13.22  21.84  2.15 
Korea            
1986  4.38 3.90 3.88  28.45  14.76  4.47 9.90  14.60  13.72  1.56 
1991  3.21 3.19 4.24  22.82  11.57  3.67  12.39 16.77 20.25  1.26 
1996  2.38 3.45 5.41  10.76  8.22 8.98  12.58 16.09 26.70  1.08 
2001  2.27 3.19 8.18 9.22 7.44  10.17 9.87 17.60  30.04 1.04 




















<Table 3> Revealed Comparative Advantage by Technological Categories     
 
PP  RB2  LT1  LT2  MT1  MT2  MT3  HT1  RB1  HT2 
China            
1986  3.28  0.72 0.84 3.04  0.51 0.04 0.59 0.10 0.04 0.46 
1991  1.28  0.57 0.73 4.21 1.27 0.77 0.67 0.62 0.36 0.28 
1996  0.77 0.67 0.75 4.13 1.75 0.11 0.77 0.72 0.85 0.50 
2001  0.57 0.59 0.68 3.81 1.75 0.17 0.72 0.86 1.28  0.34 
Korea            
1986  0.28 0.49 0.40 4.13 1.73 0.47  1.11  0.92  1.48  0.31 
1991  0.23 0.41 0.54 3.06 1.29 0.42  1.62 1.03 1.77 0.22 
1996  0.18 0.44 0.72 1.47  0.93  1.05 1.64 1.03 1.80 0.23 
2001  0.19 0.49 1.10 1.42  0.87  1.13 1.40 1.15 1.77 0.16 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data 
 
 
<Table 4> Destination of Exports as Percentage of Total Exports, % (export intensity) 
Destination  Chinese 
Export 
Japan Korea  HK ASEAN 
Other 
Asia  USA 
Other 
America  Europe Africa  Oceania 
1987 16.21 0.01 34.93 6.06  5.43 7.66 2.26 15.17 1.46 0.91 
  (2.87) (0.00)  (19.07)  (2.06) (1.61)  (0.48) (0.38)  (0.25) (1.11) (0.67) 
2001 16.89 4.70 17.49 6.91  7.16  20.43 4.33  18.33 1.82  1.53 
  (2.65) (1.83) (4.74) (1.21) (1.60)  (0.95) (0.60)  (0.40) (2.81) (1.12) 
Korean 
Export  China  HK ASEAN  Other 
Asia  USA  Other 
America  Europe Africa  Japan  Oceania 
1987 0.00  17.84  4.66 4.20 7.13  38.90 5.52  16.39 1.77  1.74 
  (0.00) (3.16) (2.55) (1.43) (2.12)  (2.43) (0.92)  (0.27) (1.34) (1.29) 
2001  12.09 10.97  6.28  10.94 11.00  20.84 7.71  15.21 2.35  2.19 
  (2.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.95) (2.50)  (0.99) (1.08)  (0.34) (3.70) (1.64) 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data 
 
 
<Table 5> Origin of Imports as Percentage of Total Imports, % (import intensity) 
Origin  Import 
of 
Japan Korea  HK ASEAN  Other 
Asia  China 
USA  Other 
America  Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 23.31 0.02 19.43 5.00  3.20 11.13 6.10 24.19 0.39  3.65 
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  (2.52) (0.01) (9.92) (1.49) (1.71) (1.12) (0.81) (0.39) (0.34) (2.57) 
2001 17.57 9.60  3.87  9.53 16.67 10.76 4.40 19.45 1.02  2.58 




China Japan  HK ASEAN  Other 
Asia  USA  Other 
America  Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 0.00  33.29  0.97 6.99 8.46  21.36 5.19 13.34 0.87  4.02 
  (0.00) (3.59) (0.49) (2.08) (4.51) (2.15) (0.68) (0.22) (0.76) (2.81) 
2001 9.43 18.88 0.87 11.28  20.65  15.90 3.69 13.27 0.62  4.54 
  (1.92) (2.53) (0.25) (1.68) (3.72) (1.18) (0.46) (0.28) (1.55) (3.26) 








<Table 6> Intra-Industry Trade Index 
    China’s trade with world  Korea’s trade with world 
Bilateral trade between 
China and Korea *
 
1987 0.25 0.29 0.00 
1991  0.35 0.34 0.10 




   2001  0.38 0.44 0.34 
1987 0.14  0.15  0.00 
1991  0.24 0.12 0.00 




   2001  0.20 0.15 0.08 
Manufacturing        
1987  0.32 0.30 0.00 
1991  0.31 0.39 0.21 




  2001  0.33 0.50 0.17 
1987 0.26  0.46  0.00 
1991  0.34 0.43 0.13 




  2001  0.46 0.41 0.29 
1987 0.33  0.36  0.00 
1991  0.55 0.44 0.20 




  2001  0.53 0.53 0.56 
1987 0.24  0.12  0.00 
1991  0.22 0.21 0.26 




  0.19  2001  0.57 0.33 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data 
* Based on data provided by Korea 
 
 




<Table 7a> Structure of Selected East Asian Exports to US    
              
China    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.04  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
5 Chemicals  0.02  0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09  0.09  0.10 
7  Mach/Equip  0.16 0.19 0.26 0.27  0.28  0.32 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.62  0.66 0.58 0.58  0.57  0.52 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
Total  US$ billions  16.261 33.673  48.506 54.396  62.532  81.776 
Indonesia            
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09  0.10  0.09 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.14  0.11 0.14 0.12  0.09  0.05 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.27  0.10 0.09 0.07  0.05  0.06 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01  0.01  0.01 
5 Chemicals  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
6  Manu  Goods  0.16 0.15 0.12 0.11  0.12  0.13 
7  Mach/Equip  0.01 0.11 0.16 0.18  0.20  0.24 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.30  0.43 0.39 0.40  0.41  0.39 
9 Comm  NES  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.01 
Total  US$  billions  3.681 5.887 7.955 8.743  9.174  9.525 
Malaysia            
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00  0.01  0.01 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.04  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.01  0.01 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.06  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01  0.01 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
5 Chemicals  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.02  0.01 
6  Manu  Goods  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03  0.03  0.03 
7  Mach/Equip  0.61 0.73 0.78 0.76  0.77  0.80 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.18  0.17 0.13 0.14  0.13  0.11 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.02 0.01  0.01  0.02 
Total  US$ billions  5.496  10. 923 17.981 18.331  18.017  21.424 
Philippines            
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05  0.04  0.04 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00 
3                                                                  Mineral Fuels  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04  0.03  0.01 
5 Chemicals  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.00  0.00  0.00 
  24                                                                                                                                                       
6  Manu  Goods  0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02  0.03 
7  Mach/Equip  0.29 0.39 0.47 0.55  0.63  0.66 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.47  0.44 0.38 0.31  0.25  0.23 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.02 
Total  US$ billions  3. 623  5.176  7.364  8.496  10.436  12.353 
Thailand             
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.18 0.17 0.15 0.14  0.13  0.14 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.02  0.02 0.04 0.03  0.03  0.02 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.02  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
5 Chemicals  0.00  0.00 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
6  Manu  Goods  0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08  0.08  0.10 
7  Mach/Equip  0.31 0.36 0.42 0.44  0.47  0.45 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.32  0.32 0.29 0.28  0.27  0.27 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.02  0.02  0.01 
Total  US$ billions  5.589  8.982  11.854 11.798  12.595  14.330 
South Korea            
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.00 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.00  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.00 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00  0.01 0.01 0.00  0.01  0.01 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
5 Chemicals  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10  0.11  0.11 
7                                                                  Mach/Equip  0.40  0.51  0.68  0.68  0.68  0.69 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.44  0.32 0.18 0.16  0.15  0.14 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.02  0.02  0.02 
Total  US$ billions  19.287 17.779  24.891 23.297  23.159  31.179 
Taiwan            
    1990 1993 1995 1996  1997  1999 
0  Food  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
5 Chemicals  0.02  0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 
6  Manu  Goods  0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13  0.13  0.13 
7  Mach/Equip  0.39 0.48 0.57 0.60  0.63  0.63 
8 Misc  Manuf  0.42  0.33 0.25 0.23  0.20  0.19 
9 Comm  NES  0.01  0.01  0.01 0.02  0.02  0.03 
Total  US$ billions  23.829 26.300  30.158 31.022  32.624  35.204 
              
Source:  Plummer (2003)               
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<Table 7b> Structure of Selected East Asian Exports to EU   
         
China    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02  0.02 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
5  Chemicals  0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.04 
6  Manu  Goods  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13  0.12 
7  Mach/Equip  0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29  0.32 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.49 0.50 0.49 0.47  0.46 
9  Comm  NES  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Total  US  billions  34.326 37.995 42.362 46.859  52.683 
Indonesia    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07  0.07 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.10  0.12 0.11 0.10  0.09 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03  0.02 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08  0.08 
5  Chemicals  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.22 0.20 0.20 0.21  0.21 
7  Mach/Equip  0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13  0.14 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.36 0.34 0.35 0.32  0.36 
9  Comm  NES  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Total  US  billions  7.975 8.970 9.430 9.993  9.323 
Malaysia    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02  0.02 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.08  0.07 0.07 0.05  0.05 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06  0.05 
5  Chemicals  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.05 
7  Mach/Equip  0.61 0.63 0.65 0.67  0.69 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12  0.12 
9  Comm  NES  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Total  US  billions  11.768 11.619 11.651 13.452  13.446 
Philippines    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03  0.03 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.04  0.04 0.05 0.03  0.02 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.11 0.07 0.04 0.05  0.03 
5  Chemicals  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 
6  Manu  Goods  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03  0.03 
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7  Mach/Equip  0.39 0.50 0.59 0.70  0.75 
8                                                           Misc Manuf  0.27  0.22  0.21  0.13  0.12 
9  Comm  NES  0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03  0.01 
Total  US  billions  3.028 3.803 4.240 6.158  6.008 
          
          
Thailand     1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15  0.14 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.05  0.05 0.04 0.03  0.03 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
5  Chemicals  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14  0.13 
7  Mach/Equip  0.32 0.37 0.39 0.41  0.44 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.29 0.25 0.24 0.23  0.23 
9  Comm  NES  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02  0.00 
          
Total  US  billions  8.474 9.419 9.493  10.218 10.449 
          
South Korea    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
5  Chemicals  0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06  0.04 
6  Manu  Goods  0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14  0.12 
7  Mach/Equip  0.68 0.68 0.69 0.67  0.72 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09  0.09 
9                                                           Comm NES  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
          
Total  US  billions  14.213 13.966 14.816 17.883  19.251 
          
          
Taiwan    1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
0  Food  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 
1  Bev/Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
2 Crude  Mat.  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 
3 Mineral  Fuels  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
4  Anim/Veg  Oils  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
5  Chemicals  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.02 
6  Manu  Goods  0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15  0.13 
7  Mach/Equip  0.62 0.66 0.66 0.67  0.69 
8  Misc  Manuf  0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15  0.16 
9  Comm  NES  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
          
Total  US  billions  15.130 16.542 17.492 19.833  20.765 
         
Source:  Plummer (2003)             
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<Table 8> Correlation of Chinese and Selected East Asian Exports to OECD Markets 
          
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, 5-Digit SITC, Selected Years) 
            
 Thai  Phil  Malay  Indo  Korea  Taiwan 
OECD            
1999 0.446  0.443  0.355 0.363 0.349  0.473 
1997 0.421  0.403  0.312  0.35  0.322  0.428 
1995 0.379  0.369  0.276 0.337 0.318  0.408 
US            
1999 0.400  0.362  0.279  0.3  0.227  0.438 
1997 0.419  0.406  0.312 0.324 0.215  0.435 
1995 0.401  0.369  0.317 0.404 0.268  0.427 
EU            
1999 0.307  0.352  0.214 0.241 0.148  0.336 
1997 0.305  0.318  0.198 0.236 0.131  0.296 
1995 0.294  0.327  0.200 0.224 0.135  0.289 
JAPAN            
1999 0.305  0.262  0.135 0.258 0.247  0.21 
1997 0.300  0.308  0.187 0.312 0.235  0.214 
1995 0.269  0.332  0.094  0.32  0.225  0.183 
Korea            
1999 0.131  0.127  0.041 Insign  NA  Insign 
1997 0.111  0.181  0.02  0.144  NA  Insign 
1995 Insign  0.123  -0.159 Insign  NA  -0.138 
            
            
  Source:  OECD, International Trade Statistics, 2003;   
    Authors' Calculations.          
            
  Note:  All coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level unless specified as  
   Insignificant  (Insign).         




<Table 9a> Determinants of FDI:  Are China and Thailand Special?   
                  
  Constant  Trade  Size  Wealth  Distance  China   Thailand  Adj. R
2 Obs. 
                  
US FDI  820.9*  0.06**  0.0001  2.51**   -0.08*  66.1  320.4  0.21  414 
  s.e.  466.9  0.009  0.51  0.57  0.046  0.95  1138     
                  
French FDI   -2696*  0.77**  0.01  2.49  0.18*  -320  154  0.27  697 
  s.e.  1277  0.05  0.02  1.83  0.08  2428  2427     
                
German FDI  -373  0.14**  0.001**   -1.55*  0.01  -669  74.8  0.32  665 
  s.e.  372  0.02  0.00001  0.73  0.039  1023  1020     
                  
Japan FDI   -778**  0.16**  0.00001*  -0.38 0.07**  -242.7  -126.5  0.78  445 
  s.e.  206.9  0.009  0.000004  0.24 0.019  409.9  394.9     
                  
Notes:                  
1.  "**" and "*" represent statistical significance at the 99% and 90% levels, respectively.   
2.  US:  1982-99; Germany:  1982-99; France:  1982-99; Japan:  1982-95        
                  
<Table 9b> Determinants of FDI from the Four Countries:  Is China Special? (Panel Approach) 
 Coefficient  Std.  Error               
Constant -793  498               
Trade 0.14**  0.01               
Size 0.0003**  6.00E-05               
Wealth 1.5*  0.58               
Distance -0.06*  0.03              
CHINA  -642 909             
THAI -50.6  904               
France 2911.7**  439                 
Germany  488  440.3  Country Fixed Effects         
Japan 4.11E+02  464.1952                 
                  
Notes:                  
1.  "**" and "*" represent statistical significance at the 99% and 90% levels, respectively.   














<Table 10> Welfare Effects of Various Chinese Commercial Policy Initiatives 
(Deviations in equivalent variations from the baseline in 2015) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7) 
Region China    ASEAN-  ASEAN- ASEAN ASEAN-  China-  GTL 
 Unilat  China  Japan  plus  3  China-EU  Japan-US 
   
 (A) Absolute deviations ($1997 billions) 
China & Hong Kong  73.3  34.8  -3.0  102.3  74.1  105.3  134.8 
Japan 13.5  1.4  18.2  66.3 4.8  77.3  116.1 
Korea  5.0 -0.4 -1.2 30.1 -1.9 -4.3 29.1 
Taiwan  5.6 -1.5 -0.7 -5.4 -2.8 -5.5 12.7 
ASEAN
b  5.4 26.0 28.4 41.8 43.0  -16.5 38.1 
United  States  13.8  0.8 -1.4 -0.9 -2.9 60.6 70.9 
Canada & ANZ
c  1.2  0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -2.9 17.3 
EU-15  16.9 3.9 0.2 6.8  127.9  -0.3  165.9 
Rest  of  the  world  7.9 -3.6 -2.4 -9.8  -18.4  -15.5  147.4 
World  142.4 61.8 37.7  231.1 223.4 198.1 732.2 
(B) Percent deviations 
China  &  Hong  Kong  2.9 1.4  -0.1 4.0 2.9 4.1 5.3 
Japan  0.3 0.0 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.9 2.8 
Korea  0.6 -0.1 -0.1  3.7 -0.2 -0.5  3.6 
Taiwan  1.0 -0.3 -0.1 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0  2.4 
ASEAN  0.5 2.5 2.7 4.0 4.2  -1.6 3.7 
United  States  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 
Canada & ANZ  0.1  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.2 1.4 
EU-15  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.5 0.0 2.0 
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Rest  of  the  world  0.1 -0.1  0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3  2.4 
World  0.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.6 2.1 
b Only Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam are included in ASEAN. In the GTAP 
database, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are aggregated into the rest of the world. 
c Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Source:  Hiro Lee, David Roland-Holst, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “China's Emergence and East Asian Trade 
under Alternative Trading Arrangements,” Journal of Asian Economics, Forthcoming 2004, Table 1. 
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